Foucault Docet by Rovatti, Pier Aldo
www.cosmosandhistory.org 17
Cosmos and History: The Journal of  Natural and Social Philosophy, vol. 5, no. 1, 2009
Foucault DoCeT
Pier aldo Rovatti
University of  Trieste
AbstrAct: In a wry response to Negri’s article, Pier aldo Rovatti—one of the key figures behind 
the pensiero debole (‘weak thought’) movement attacked by Negri in The Italian Difference—
defends the Foucauldian inspiration behind his own understanding of philosophy. He points 
to the anachronism of the national image of thought put forward by Negri in his article and 
questions his interpretation of the problem of difference. Rovatti disputes the idea that philosophy 
can synthesize by fiat different expressions of subjectivity into a unitary political subject, and calls 
for a reflexive clarification of the tasks of the philosopher, one that would not end up recreating 
a logic of mastery. 
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In spite of appearances, antonio Negri’s obscure pamphlet The Italian Difference does not 
really lend itself to a polemical discussion. It must be taken for what it is, a coup de théâtre 
dictated—as the author himself confesses—by a rather ingenuous moment of hubris. at 
the end of the day, it is a sparata, as we say in Italian. Such a blast would intend to strike 
at the entirety of Italian contemporary thought (and with particular violence against 
so-called ‘weak thought’) in its capacity as a philosophy of  the master; at the same time, 
it positively exempts from this treatment three names—the old Gramsci, and the new 
Mario tronti, the workerist, and luisa Muraro, the feminist—in their capacity as, it 
would seem, philosophies that creatively resists the master by means of  difference. Everything else 
is a desert.
If there are no doubts about Gramsci, the two other names are—even for an Ital-
ian—quite unexpected. I wonder what those concerned by this bizarre ordering think 
about it (and then I ask myself: What status does he who arranges them arrogate to him-
self? Is he like the fourth man officiating at a football match?). Mario tronti stood aside 
many years ago, avoiding the public scene; luisa Muraro, whom I know very well, is on 
the contrary very present on the feminine front. She appears on television and even in 
glossy magazines without fear of becoming what Negri would call a ‘game show host-
ess’. along with these choices, we could produce many others, just as arbitrary and per-
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sonal: this reminds me of the habit, quite in vogue in Italy, whereby everybody imagines 
himself to be the coach of the national football team and dictates his own line-up. So, 
I’ll drop it.
as for Negri’s intended targets, they revolve around the old motif, often used in 
reactionary terms, of the ‘poverty’ of Italian philosophy. I just want to say something 
about weak thought (‘the vilest point’ of the twentieth-century decline, as Negri deli-
cately describes it), considering the fact that, at the beginning of the 1980s, I was its pro-
moter together with Gianni Vattimo. Weak thought was an episode in the Italian philo-
sophical debate that aroused considerable alarm in academia and whose effects (which 
also had significant international echoes) have yet to die out. these effects, which in 
part intersected with those of deconstruction, should induce some caution even in the 
worst-disposed of critics. I mean that, were he to exercise such caution, Negri would 
realise that what is at stake here is an issue of power [potere] that concerns the so-called 
metaphysical violence of philosophy, its administration of truth, and the elements of mi-
cro-government that follow from it, beginning with the real privileges that exist in the 
institutional circles of research.
I think Negri is well aware that there is a front of struggle within philosophy, related 
to the very way in which the scientificity of concepts is understood and knowledge as power 
[potere] is used. Negri’s sharp mind cannot overlook this Foucauldian inspiration of weak 
thought, unless he does so deliberately. as a matter of fact, his very strong thought could 
obviously fall into the critical horizon of weak thought itself.
I’m sorry to say this to a friend, but this pamphlet by Negri on the Italian difference 
is full of superficialities, that is, hurried verdicts which, as if wielding a machete, take 
the place of the reflection required by critical discourse. When sarcasm becomes the 
systematic shortcut for analysis, I doubt that philosophy remains (as Negri writes in the 
opening of his pamphlet) ‘that critical activity that allows one to grasp one’s time and 
orientate oneself in it’. I fully agree with this definition, to the extent that I’d like to bear 
it in mind when discussing some of the, so to speak, serious aspects that underlie Negri’s 
text—since it is clear that something serious, and thus really discussible, both inspires it 
and makes it cohere.
My first observation concerns the emphasis on national character. the author of empire, 
and other volumes that articulated its hypothesis, is the same author who, ever since 
his association with Mario tronti at the beginnings of so-called ‘workerism’, has always 
stressed the multinational and ultimately global dimension of capitalism, and the cor-
relative international and worldwide dimension of anti-capitalistic struggle. the subject 
in transformation in these struggles (in the sense that this subject is by now no longer the 
factory worker of the 1960s) does not identify himself with national characteristics, and, 
if he does so, he condemns himself to a theoretical and practical delay that corresponds 
with the worst vice of the ‘lefts’ that Negri dislikes, insofar as they are inevitably retro-
grade vis-à-vis the imperial phase in which we live.
But in that case even an analysis of philosophical thought in specifically national 
terms will be similarly retrograde and, in a word, anachronistic. For instance, an evalua-
PIER alDo RoVattI 19
tion of weak thought that did not take into account the international intellectual hori-
zon, European and extra-European, in which it operates (Michel Foucault’s discourse 
on power [potere], Jacques Derrida’s deconstruction, Richard Rorty’s ideas), would be 
meaningless. Just like other struggles, philosophical struggle, with its fronts of resistance, 
takes place on a global scene that far exceeds—in its practices—national vicissitudes.
What’s more, Negri’s own thought is clear proof of this: it is enough to observe the 
use he makes of a number of philosophical contributions to describe the condition of 
empire, and, in particular, the valorisation of theoretical strategies borrowed from Gilles 
Deleuze and Michel Foucault. In my view, it follows from this that the problem of an 
‘Italian difference’ simply does not exist or is entirely artificial (and backward-looking). 
While what evidently remains important, and perhaps essential, is the problem of  differ-
ence. It is with regard to this problem that we are called to provide critical clarification, 
one that acknowledges its genealogy (thus passing through Nietzsche and Heidegger); 
evaluates the legacy of a phase (basically, that of Deleuze), about which it is justifiable 
to ask whether difference has inclined towards a metaphysics of difference; and finally 
gives the right weight to Derrida’s proposals (and thus his idea of deconstruction) which, 
as it is well-known, produced considerable insight into social practices, for instance into 
those of women. this is a problematic picture, one that needs to be explored with 
proper attention and circumspection. on the contrary, Negri simply assumes it at first 
blush, with excessive haste.
My second critical observation concerns Negri’s overall approach. First, I note his 
insistence on the word creativity. It is difficult to disagree with him: behind this philosoph-
ical operator lies the couple Bergson-Deleuze, on which the group behind aut aut, the 
journal I edit (and which Negri knows well), has worked a lot in recent years. It is doubt-
less the case that Deleuze elabourates the idea of creative philosophy and conceptual 
invention with great originality. However, Negri applies it to a scenario that appears po-
litically pregnant yet somewhat simplified. For him, it is as if there were only two levels: 
that of anti-capitalist struggles, and that of the theoretical tools suitable to represent and 
promote them. any other term or mediation is excluded.
this scenario is a little bit magical, and actually cuts through differences and con-
flicts on both sides. It is by no means irrefutable that global struggles produce a uniform 
intelligence and, given that diversity appears to be a basic assumption with regard to this 
point, it is possible, and even desirable, that different expressions of  subjectivity realise them-
selves, with valid points of individual specificity. Would the task of philosophy be that of 
unifying them in a strong thought of struggles? answering ‘yes’ is problematic, to say the 
least. an answer that would guarantee such diversity using a thought that is sufficiently 
supple and open to the plurality of instances would seem more coherent. a thought that 
knows how to put itself on the line and renounce the haste of truth, in brief, a thought 
that is able to ward off its claims to hegemony. 
all this leads us to the other dimension of the problem, itself characterised by a 
debate between positions, that is, by what could be called a struggle within philosophy. 
there is no trace of this in Negri’s pamphlet, while, in my view, such a conflict of posi-
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tions should be taken very seriously if one wishes to broaden one’s perception of prac-
tices and form a microphysical picture of the balance of powers [poteri] in theoretical 
struggles. Foucault docet. otherwise, at every turn, one runs the risk of taking refuge in 
positions exposed to dogmatism and, conversely, carrying out unproductive erasures, 
that is, throwing out the baby with the bath water. 
the friend-enemy paradigm is useful only if it is the result of a search for identity, 
not the presupposition of a discourse. It seems banal to observe that if we speak of phi-
losophy we first of all need to understand each other well regarding the status of phi-
losophy and the so-called philosopher. once we have agreed on the fact that philosophy 
must be a critical orientation vis-à-vis present reality, multiple foldings and differentia-
tions appear on the scene, and there impose themselves just as many deconstructions of 
this very assumption which, at every turn, tends to congeal into an abstract presupposi-
tion. as Negri knows perfectly well, these foldings and differences are not the creation 
of isolated minds, uprooted from actual contexts, and they measure themselves up to the 
identity and status that the so-called philosopher assumes at any given time. 
Such a ‘philosopher’ is never completely foreign to a disciplinary apparatus, to be 
understood as the historical disciplinarity of philosophy qua knowledge and as an insti-
tutional apparatus in which his practice of thought is always being produced. Without a 
critical clarification concerning the philosopher’s stance both within and without disci-
pline, we run the risk of turning him into a mythical figure and maybe, precisely for this 
reason, one who is very close to the logic of the master.
translated by lorenzo chiesa
